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Chandran Kukathas
Exit, Freedom and Gender
Day and night I ponder on the means by which it might be possible to escape the strict
moral code and customs of my country yet … The old Eastern traditions are ﬁrm and strong
but I could shake them from me, break them, if it were not for that other bond, even more
securely and strongly ﬁxed than any centuries old tradition, which binds me to my world:
the love I have for those who gave me life, to whom I owe everything, everything – Raden
Adjeng Kartini, 25 May 1899, Japara1
An important part of being free is not having to associate with, or reside among,
others whose ways, beliefs, or very persons, one cannot abide. Freedom is, to a
great extent, freedom of exit. An appreciation of this dimension of freedom runs
through the liberal political tradition which has generally, if imperfectly, recog-
nized the importance of being able to separate ourselves from our fellows, even
if there are many goods we can only produce – and sometimes enjoy – with the
cooperation of others. To be denied in an attempt to exit – to divorce a husband,
to quit a job, to emigrate, or to leave a religion or group in which one has been
brought up – is to be rendered unfree. As Susan Okin has written, ‘Not to be able
to leave the group in which one has been raised for an alternative mode of life is
a serious violation of the kind of freedom that is basic to liberalism.’2
Yet while the importance of freedom of exit is uncontroversial, at least
among those sympathetic to the liberal ideal, the ultimate worth of this freedom
is a more complex matter. What, precisely, does freedom of exit amount to? And
is a right of exit necessarily of value – or equally valuable to everyone? In the
literature on multiculturalism and group rights, many have argued that asser-
tions of the signiﬁcance of freedom of exit have greatly exaggerated its worth.
This is because such assertions have failed to recognize that freedom of exit
cannot readily be exercised by many who might possess that freedom in princi-
ple, and that it is not something that can be enjoyed by all equally in the absence
of other social conditions. Women in particular are not well-served by the exit
principle.
This argument is put with especial force by Susan Okin, in an essay discuss-
ing the worth of exit rights in any theory of the rights of illiberal minorities in the
liberal state. She suggests that ‘the right of exit, while no doubt important, does
1 Coté/Clayton 1995, p.1.
2 Okin 2002, 206.
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not have the clout it is often thought to have in arguments defending the rights
of illiberal groups within liberal contexts. Instead, it is inherently problematic.
Those most likely to need it are those least likely to be able to employ it. Neither
may they see it as a desirable or even an imaginable option.’3 She therefore
concludes her analysis by arguing that the liberal state ‘should not only not give
special rights or exemptions to cultural and religious groups that discriminate
against or oppress women. It should also enforce individual rights against such
groups when the opportunity arises and encourage all groups within its borders
to cease such practices.’4
In putting this argument, Okin is elaborating a position she has taken in a
number of earlier papers discussing the tension between feminism and multi-
culturalism.5 In her view, to the extent that women’s interests and cultural rights
come into conﬂict, the former should take priority. Indeed, she makes it quite
clear that cultural communities or traditions that are inconsistent with liberal
feminism should not be subsidised, or even encouraged. The liberal state should,
in her assessment, take steps to re-educate such groups, and, if necessary,
punish them if their practices are harmful to women – making it plain that such
things will not be tolerated. Implicit in the earlier papers, and explicit in the
more recent one, is the contention that invoking women’s freedom of exit is not
suﬃcient to exonerate groups from responsibility for women’s oppression, or to
justify the continued toleration (let alone subsidising) of their practices. If the
interests of women are to be served, steps must be taken to ensure that they
enjoy ‘realistic rights of exit’. And this means more deliberate intervention on
the part of the state to foster and protect the freedom of individual women.
Okin is not alone in all of this. A number of other writers have questioned
the wisdom of placing any considerable weight on the exit principle unless the
freedom to exit is bolstered by further supports. Theorists such as Brian Barry,
Ayelet Shachar, and Jeﬀ Spinner-Halev, among others, have suggested that being
free to leave is not enough.6 And, like Okin, they have also been critical of my
own defence of the exit principle in some previous papers.7 Is it time for the
unencumbered or Plain Exit Principle to be shown the door?
The purpose of this paper is to argue that the Plain Exit Principle is more
important than has so far been conceded, and that its limitations reﬂect not so
3 Ibid., 207.
4 Ibid., 229–30.
5 Okin 1998; Okin 1999.
6 See Barry 2001 and Barry 2002, Shachar 2001; Spinner-Halev 2000.
7 I have presented this defence in Kukathas 1992a, 105–39; and: Kukathas 1992b, 674–80;
and Kukathas 1997, 69–104.
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much the inadequacy of the principle as the nature of dilemma it addresses. The
diﬃculty of that dilemma is most evident when the claims of feminism confront
the demands of multiculturalism. The argument is presented in four stages. The
ﬁrst outlines the Plain Exit Principle, oﬀering an account of the more general
theory of which it is a part. The second stage elaborates the major objections to
the Plain Exit Principle, focussing primarily on the arguments developed by
Susan Okin, but also drawing on the writings of others to extend the scope and
force of this critique. The third stage oﬀers a reply to the critique of the Plain Exit
Principle, and the fourth concludes with some more general reﬂections on the
tension between feminism and multiculturalism.
The Plain Exit Principle
Human beings invariably ﬁnd themselves living in association with others and
yet in disagreement about what should be the proper terms of association. In
such circumstances, what right does any individual have against his or her
fellows? Some theorists have tried to construct substantial accounts of individual
rights suggesting that there are a variety of freedoms or entitlements that any
society must provide its members: freedoms of speech and assembly, for exam-
ple, or entitlements to hold property. But while such freedoms are valuable and
important, to assert their signiﬁcance, or declare them to be fundamental rights,
does not get around the problem of disagreement among people about what
should be the proper terms of association. How should such disagreement be
resolved? Two alternatives present themselves to us. The ﬁrst is for the stronger
to exercise their power over the weaker to compel them to accept their terms. The
second is for each to try to persuade the other about what those terms should be.
If we reject the ﬁrst alternative as philosophically uncompelling, the question
becomes: what right does each have against the others if he or she is unable to
persuade the others to abide by particular terms of association – particularly
once they have exhausted all avenues through which to secure agreement,
including searching for an umpire by whose determinations they could abide?
The only right each can have remaining is the right to leave. Call this the ‘plain
exit principle’.
In the end, there are only three options available: to live together with others
on particular terms we may or may not like, but do accept; to be forced to live
together with others on terms we do not accept; or to separate. In the liberal
political tradition it is the freedom to separate that is of critical importance.
Individuals may not be forced into membership of a collective simply because it
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is held that this would be good for the collective; nor may the individual be
forced into membership because it is alleged to be good for him or her. It is an
implication of all of this that freedom of exit – indeed, a right of exit – is of pre-
eminent importance.
It is also important, however, to recognize a further implication of this
analysis. If each has a right to decline to accept an oﬀer of membership on terms
of association she cannot abide, a collective of individuals equally has a right to
decline to oﬀer membership to any individual whose terms they are unwilling to
accept. No party has any right to force another to live by terms unacceptable to
the other.
The principle of exit is not an easy one to live by: it is not a helpful norm for
social organization. The most obvious reason why is that, at its core, lies an
insistence on individual freedom to abandon social engagement – to unorganize.
It is an anarchistic principle. But there are other reasons. First, because humans
not only need to associate but also long to do so, they will usually compromise
in order to remain together: the opportunity cost of dissociation is almost always
too high. In the associations they form they will invariably institute procedures
to settle disagreements so that disagreement doesn’t need to threaten dissolution
of the collective. Disagreement in itself is unlikely to provoke the exercise of the
freedom to exit; other solutions will be sought ﬁrst for as long as humans remain
social animals – which is to say, for as long as they remain human. Second,
because humans often cannot abide disagreement they will, if they can acquire
suﬃcient power, exercise that power to compel others to associate with them on
their terms – denying those thus compelled any right of exit. The love of the
exercise of power is, alas, no less strikingly human a characteristic than is the
desire to associate with others.
But while the facts of social psychology suggest that the exit principle will
never explain why human beings continue to associate, the logic of association
suggests that the right of exit is the only demand upon which all parties can
insist. All cannot demand a right to associate each on his or her own terms. No
one can demand a right to compel others to join with him or with one another if
such a right is to be one that all can claim.
Liberal societies are ones which try to respect this principle as far as is
possible, for they consider the good society to be one which comes as close as
possible to being what John Rawls calls a “voluntary scheme”.8 To serve this
8 Rawls, 1999, 12: ‘a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a
society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal
persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair.’
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end, they must therefore be societies that leave room for dissent, so that those
who disagree with the views of others or reject the attitudes of the majority may
ﬁnd room to live by their own lights – exiting from arrangements they cannot
abide.When the world was divided in the days of the Cold War, the most obvious
diﬀerence between the Communist states and the “free world” was that the
citizens of the former were not permitted to exit. In a liberal society, no one can
be compelled to stay. And a liberal society does not recognize the authority of
anyone to compel people to remain in associations or under arrangements of
which they want no further part.
The implication of all this for the place of groups of any sort in a liberal
society should therefore be plain. No group can claim for itself the right to
compel anyone to abide by its demands or to remain within the boundaries of its
association. It cannot claim authority over its members unless its members
recognize its authority over them; and if it claims authority over people who
decline to accept it, that authority would not be recognized or re-enforced by any
liberal society. Nor indeed can it claim support simply to help bolster its declin-
ing membership or staunch the ﬂow of the disaﬀected, for no one is under an
obligation to ensure that any particular group or association prevail, or even
endure. No group has the right to survive.
At the heart of the principle, exit as it is understood here, then, is what
might be called a principle of non-recognition. No one has the right to compel
others to associate with anyone, and to compel others to submit to his (or his
group’s) authority. Any such claim to authority must go unrecognized, and any
right claimed by such groups or persons to deny those in their control the
freedom to exit must also go unrecognized.
This holds whatever the nature of the group, whether it is an organization or
a club or a church or a cultural group or a province or a nation. None of these
associations has any claim upon others to recognize its authority over its mem-
bers, particularly if those members wish to leave. No one is under any obligation
to enable the association to survive, whether by forcibly returning its ﬂeeing
members, or by oﬀering it assistance to sustain its activities. Association, if it is
free association, is a two-way relationship, in which both parties must at all
times retain the right to discontinue the relationship. No cost that one party
might suﬀer as a result of the ending of that relationship can justify its forcing
the other to remain in association – though the terms of separation may have to
reﬂect the costs borne by one party if the end of the aﬀair violates previous
agreements made. (Performance of a contract cannot be compelled, but this does
not imply a right to non-performance without compensation.)
In the case of cultural groups, it means that the cultural defence is no
defence at all if it seeks to justify the denying the freedom of individual members
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to break away from the group’s traditions. The group has no right to stop people
leaving. Nor has it any claim upon others to be given the resources to discourage
their members from deserting its ranks.While it may use its own resources to try
to sustain its traditions or customs, it cannot demand that others should value
this. And to the extent that its practices are harmful to some members, it must
run the risk that those members will desert the group to make their lives else-
where.
What is or is not harmful, is, of course, a highly debated matter – even
though there is also much agreement across all times and cultures about good
and bad, right and wrong. One of the reasons for disagreement about harm is
that it is very seldom harm simpliciter that is at issue. Any understanding of
harm involves some view of the tradeoﬀs that must invariably be made when
assessing the worth of an option. Some harms are deemed acceptable to those
who suﬀer them because of the beneﬁts that accompany them: the harm of
smoking, drinking and eating tasty food may be oﬀset by the pleasure these
vices bring. Other harms are deemed acceptable because they are deemed prefer-
able to other, greater, harms that are averted by bearing lesser ones. People
endure surgery, medicines, diets and exercise to feel – or at least look – better in
the future. And, of course, people frequently opt to suﬀer harms so that others
might beneﬁt. Most obviously, parents commonly sacriﬁce their own good for the
good of their children.
It is precisely because there are such tradeoﬀs, and because costs and
beneﬁts are weighed diﬀerently by diﬀerent people, that many liberals have been
reluctant to deny the individual the right to determine for himself how the
tradeoﬀ it to be made. Each person is entitled to walk away from an option, even
if it looks favourable, if he is unwilling to accept the cost – or to embrace an
option, even if it looks unfavourable, if he thinks the costs are acceptable in light
of the beneﬁts on oﬀer. It is only when the costs or harms are unwillingly borne
by others that the individual’s freedom may be impeded. At this point the
diﬃculty, as well as the necessity, of people being able to separate their lives
becomes most clearly apparent.
The principle of exit suggests that people should be left free to determine for
themselves whether or not a form of association is to their advantage.The problem
with this is that there can be no assurance that people will decide well. They may
court danger and embrace harm; or forgo beneﬁts; or make tradeoﬀs with which
many of us would not agree. None of this, however, is suﬃcient to overturn the
exit principle. The obvious question, then, is: why should the exit principle be
accorded such importance? The answer returns us to the point with which discus-
sion began in this section. The principle of exit is the principle most consistent
with the repudiation of force as a means of determining how people should live. It
Exit, Freedom and Gender 39
<i>On Exit : Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Right of Exit in Liberal Multicultural Societies</i>, edited by Dagmar Borchers,
         and Annamari Vitikainen, De Gruyter, Inc., 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=893612.
Created from smu on 2019-10-15 20:01:19.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 D
e 
G
ru
yt
er
, I
nc
.. 
Al
l r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
rejects the idea that the voice of the majority should prevail over that of the
minority, or that the strong should prevail over the weak. It is consistent with the
conviction that we should seek to persuade rather than compel those with whom
we disagree to come around to our way of thinking– and living.
It is important to note here that it will not do to say that compulsion is
justiﬁed only when it is exercised by those who are right over those who are
wrong. By deﬁnition, compulsion can only be exercised by the strong over the
weak. And by hypothesis, the strong will think they are in the right, while the
weak deny any such thing.When the question of right and wrong is in dispute, it
is no argument for the strong to justify compulsion on the grounds that it is right.
‘I have the truth on my side, therefore my violences are good works: Such a one is
in an error, therefore his Violences are criminal.’9 This is invariably the argument
the strong oﬀer. The principle of exit suggests that the strong may justiﬁably seek
only to persuade the weak to see things diﬀerently, permit them to exit from the
association of which they are both a part, or tolerate their dissent.
A few things should be noted here. First, in permitting the weak to exit the
strong cannot claim that their conduct is entirely fair or just. They may simply be
taking unfair advantage of their strength to reject very reasonable demands.
Second, to allow people to exit from an association does not mean forcing them
oﬀ property or lands they have occupied: one can sometimes dissociate without
leaving physically. Third, it may sometimes be quite unjust to force people to
leave. Refugees, typically, have exercised a freedom to exit, but have been,
directly or indirectly, the victims of injustice.
The principle of exit does not presume that one party exercising the freedom
to depart means that the terms of separation are just or fair. The point of the
principle is to say that, in the absence of agreement on the terms of association,
the various parties to the association can claim only the right to leave, and not
the right to force others to accept particular terms they might reject. Moreover, if
any parties choose not to exit this must be taken to mean acquiescence (whether
enthusiastic or reluctant) in the terms of association, and acceptance of the
legitimacy of its authority. What the principle of exit therefore requires of out-
siders or third parties is a stance of neutrality and, so, non-intervention in the
terms of association of any group; but also non-recognition of any right of the
group or its authorities to continue to exist, or to enforce those terms on
reluctant members. They will not invade the group to try to change the terms of
association to favour one sub-group or another; but neither will they give the
existing authority succour by supporting its eﬀorts to perpetuate existing cus-
9 Bayle 1708, 146.
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toms and traditions, or assisting it in its eﬀorts to suppress dissent. The group’s
ruling authorities will no doubt complain that this stance is not neutral, since
failing to assist it in suppressing dissent, or to provide resources to sustain group
traditions, in eﬀect gives more power to dissenting forces. And dissenters will
also complain that not to intervene on their behalf is simply to strengthen the
hand or ruling authorities or majority group opinion. And there is some truth in
both these complaints. But the fact that there is an element of truth in both
complaints strengthens the case for a non-interventionist stance, which respects
a right of exit but not a right to anything more.
A Critique of the Plain Exit Principle
According to Susan Okin, the right of exit is inherently problematic. And to her
mind this comes out particularly clearly when one considers the situation of
women within repressive groups or cultures. She points out that if ‘girls and
women are treated unequally in various important ways within their cultural
groups, it cannot but aﬀect their capacities to exercise the right of exit’.10 More-
over, she continues, ‘women’s having an unequal capacity to exit leads to
another signiﬁcant inequality, for it cannot but aﬀect their potential to inﬂuence
the directions taken by the group.’11 As a consequence, ‘they have less chance of
being able to change the group’s norms and practices – including being able to
remedy their status and to achieve gender equality within the group.’12 The right
of exit cannot serve as a palliative for oppression for another reason: ‘in many
circumstances, oppressed persons, in particular women, are not only less able to
exit but have many reasons not to want to exit the culture of origin; the very idea
may be unthinkable.’13 In fact, Okin remarks, such women ‘want, and should
have the right, to be treated fairly within’ their cultural groups.14
Clearly, Okin favours intervention to address the problem of women’s op-
pression, particularly when it occurs within groups in the liberal state.15 The
10 Okin 2002, 207.
11 Ibid., 207.
12 Ibid., 207.
13 Ibid., 207.
14 Ibid., 207.
15 Perhaps intervention would also be justiﬁed, for Okin, to rescue from oppression women
who are suﬀering under regimes outside the liberal state. However, I am not aware of any
treatment of this issue in Okin’s writings.
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liberal state, she thinks, should act to protect women from groups whose ways
violate their individual rights – ‘preferably by education but where necessary by
punishment’.16 And in putting this view, she criticizes a number of theorists who
consider exit rights important, including Joseph Raz, William Galston, and
myself. I will not rehearse in any detail Okin’s objections to Raz and Galston,
since their theories defend group rights in a way that my view does not. Okin
and I are in agreement in this regard, though perhaps not always for the same
reasons. I will focus instead on her criticisms of the exit principle as they apply
to the theory presented here.
The central claim of Okin’s argument is that, in the absence of intervention
to uphold their rights, women in many cultural groups cannot enjoy meaningful
rights of exit, for to enjoy such a right it is necessary not only to have somewhere
to go but also ‘the capacity to get there.’17 In many cultural groups, however,
women are simply given very little opportunity to acquire that capacity. More
particularly, the attitudes and practices of many groups towards the education of
women, their rules concerning marriage and divorce, and the ways in which they
socialize women to reinforce gender roles and a gender hierarchy, work against
women acquiring any serious capacity to exit their traditions or their commu-
nities.
In the case of education, Okin suggests, much of the problem stems from
parental freedom to ‘deﬁne and restrict their children’s education’.18 One conse-
quence of this is that many girls go to schools in which they are taught ‘that they
are less than fully equal to boys and that their proper role in life is to care for
their families and to obey their husbands.’19 And such attitudes, she goes on to
observe, are not conﬁned to the ‘fundamentalist fringes’ but are evident even in
the expressed views of the largest Protestant denomination in the United States,
the Southern Baptists. And the children subjected to the education delivered by
such religious groups, in her view, have their rights violated in being ‘subject to
this and other forms of indoctrination.’20 More importantly, their capacity to exit
is restricted both by the socialization which disinclines girls to consider any
other kind of life, and by the loss of educational qualiﬁcations which might
supply them with resources they need to break away.
The rules and customs of marriage operate to disadvantage women in
similar ways. Early or involuntary marriage not only creates inequalities in
16 Okin 1998, 676.
17 Okin 2002, 228.
18 Ibid., 218.
19 Ibid., 218.
20 Ibid., 218.
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marriage but also makes exit harder – though often there are lesser rights of exit
from a bad marriage for women. Marriage, at least under such circumstances,
has the eﬀect of imprisoning women in many ways. It limits their educational
opportunities, lowers their expectations or life ambitions, and leaves them
encumbered with responsibilities that make it diﬃcult to exit the marriage, let
alone the culture.21
In general, the upbringing experienced by girls in many cultures tends to
lower their self-esteem, which, Okin argues, further weakens their capacity to
exercise any right of exit they might formally possess. Women tend to bear the
burden of their parents’ expectations that they will act as conduits through
which culture is transmitted to the next generation. Even if the right of exit is
there, the burden of disappointing parents is almost too much to bear. For a
woman to have the option of appealing to the law against her parents in order to
prevent an unwanted marriage, or to change her religion to escape its strictures,
is often to have two options neither of which ‘is thinkable for her, for, given the
manner in which she has been raised, by doing either, she would lose much that
she most values in life.’22 The exit solution is no solution at all, and Okin quotes
Ayelet Shachar, who makes this point very vigorously when she writes: ‘the right
of exit “solution” … throws on the already beleaguered individual the responsi-
bility to either miraculously transform the legal-institutional conditions that
keep her vulnerable or ﬁnd the resources to leave her whole world behind.’23
There are other problems with the exit solution. For one thing, it does not
secure freedom from oppression because the most vulnerable members of the
community – women and children – are the ones who will ﬁnd exit most diﬃcult
and costly. Okin therefore rejects the idea that the existence of a wider society
into which individuals may escape is suﬃcient to make freedom of exit credible.
If that wider society tolerates the practices of the group, ‘it is impossible to see
how some members – a child who has been allowed to die, for example – could
leave; and it is hard to see how others could leave without enormous diﬃculty,
including persons of both sexes deprived of the education required for alterna-
tive modes of life and girls and women who had, in addition, no access to
property, had undergone clitoridectomy, or had been forced into unequal mar-
riages (especially if at an early age, without access to contraception, or with little
or no possibility of initiating divorce).’24
21 Ibid., 219.
22 Ibid., 222.
23 Shachar 2000, 64–89, at p.80; quoted in Okin 2002, 222.
24 Okin 2002, 228.
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A similar point is made by Shachar, who adds two further objections to the
exit principle. First, she argues that to insist on a non-interventionist state policy
requires maintaining ‘a rigid conceptual distinction between the “inside,”minor-
ity group-controlled realm, and the “outside,” state-controlled realm.’ By over-
essentiallizing the distance between minority group culture and the dominant
state culture, my view denies the inevitable interplay between them. This non-
interventionist policy prescription, thus, may ‘end up reifying group identity by
turning an essentially ﬂuid mutable cache of customs, beliefs, and practices into
a far more ﬁxed and unchanging one.’25
Second, she argues that the exit principle as I have defended it assumes that
individuals born into minority groups have eﬀectively chosen membership if they
have not elected to leave. This, she thinks, relies on a further assumption that
downplays the fact that individuals possess multiple aﬃliations – ‘to their
minority groups, genders, religions, families, states, and so on.’ Yet these ‘diﬀer-
ent facets of individual identity may overlap and crisscross in complex ways.
None can be said to have absolute priority over all others at all times.’26 Ignoring
the potentially ﬂuid intersection of aﬃliations, she says, reduces the richness of
personal identity into a single opposition: group member vs. citizen. ‘This rigid
framework means that once state citizens enter (or choose to remain within)
minority communities, they are regarded solely as group members. And group
members are further presumed to have relinquished the set of rights and protec-
tions granted to them by virtue of their citizenship.’27
Shachar concludes her critique by suggesting that if a certain group member
does not avail herself of a right of exit this is because, in my view, ‘she has
chosen to accept all of her group’s practices and policies, including those that
violate her basic state-protected rights as citizen.’And Shachar adds: ‘Kukathas’s
blindness to individual diﬀerences of position within cultural community hierar-
chies thus allows him to condone state inaction with respect to minority groups’
aﬀairs, even in the face of group-sanctioned, systemic maltreatment of certain
classes of group members.’28
Neither Okin nor Shachar think that freedom of exit is unimportant. Their
point is that, in the absence of state intervention, a formal right of exit is
inadequate to ensure that any such freedom exists. And women in particular will
not enjoy freedom when they are members of groups or cultures that do not
nurture – or, indeed, positively hamper – the development of capacities needed
25 Shachar 2001, 69–70.
26 Ibid., 70. A similar point is made by Spinner-Halev 2000, 83.
27 Shachar 2001, 70.
28 Ibid., 70.
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to exercise the right to exit. A similar point is made by Brian Barry in his more
general treatment of the problem of exit. According to Barry, it is ‘a legitimate
object of public policy to ensure as far as possible that members of associations
have real exit options available to them’.29 This means, for example, that
‘children must be brought up in a way that will enable them to leave behind the
groups into which they were born, if they so choose’.30 It means that the state
should intervene in cases where the costs of exit are ‘excessive’.31
Should the state intervene to make exit possible, and do we need a better
account of the right of exit than the plain exit principle provides? We should turn
directly to this question now.
Exit and Gender
In spite of the diﬃculties identiﬁed by these theorists, the plain exit principle is
worth holding onto. To appreciate this we need to see what it is that the principle
can – as well as what it cannot – accomplish, and to see what is troubling about
the alternatives. This will require a response to the problems raised by Susan
Okin in particular. Before turning to this matter, however, some of the arguments
presented by Shachar need to be addressed brieﬂy; although they do not pose so
serious a challenge, they distract attention from more diﬃcult issues and, so,
need to be disposed of.
Shachar places great emphasis on the fact that cultural groups are historical
entities, whose characters have been shaped as much by their interaction with
the dominant state culture in which they have found themselves. Many members
of groups indeed possess multiple aﬃliations, and are not simply members of a
single group. It is therefore a mistake to ‘essentialize’ groups, and to turn the
problem of multicultural accommodation into a simple conﬂict between minority
group member on the one hand, and citizen on the other. It is a mistake she says
I make, though it is a failing she also ﬁnds in Okin’s work.
The minor problem with this is that it presents an inaccurate account of my
expressed views (and also, I think, of Okin’s). For one thing, I had taken
considerable trouble to emphasise the ﬂuid and mutable nature of groups –
arguing that this was an important reason not to reify groups by recognizing
29 Barry 2001, 149.
30 Ibid., 149.
31 Ibid., 150. I have responded to Barry in detail in Kukathas 2002, 184–203.
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group rights for present cultural formations.32 Moreover, I have explicitly recog-
nized that individuals are not only members of groups but also of another legal
and political order, and suggested that this limits the capacity of cultural
communities that wish to remain ‘fully integrated into the mainstream of society’
to simply go it alone and ‘live according to ways which betray little respect for
the individual.’33 In general, I have emphasised that the public realm itself
should be regarded as the product of compromise among diﬀerent groups and
traditions with diﬀerent values and beliefs, and that the identities of individuals,
no less than the understandings of communities, are unavoidably changed by
the process of interaction.34
The more serious problem, however, is that dwelling on the fact of multiple
memberships or allegiances is simply a distraction from the issue when conﬂicts
arise between the demands of group membership and the rights of citizenship.
At the point of conﬂict there has to be a ‘rigid conceptual opposition between the
“inside” minority group-controlled realm, and the “outside” state-controlled
realm.’35 The entire purpose of theory here is to address the question of how the
opposition between one entity and another should be handled. And to address it
properly, it is necessary to set up that opposition at its most problematic and
(seemingly) intractable. There is much merit in Shachar’s contention that multi-
ple allegiances may work to the advantage of those who advocate compromise
settlements that do not enhance the power either of the state over the group, or
the group over the individual. But the question remains, what principle holds
when disagreement persists? One option is a principle of intervention to uphold
some conception of individual rights. Another is the principle of exit. Both have
their diﬃculties, but the latter is the one defended here.
32 See Kukathas 1992a, 105–39.
33 Ibid.
34 For example, I say (ibid. p. 85): ‘Indeed, cultural communities would be more profoundly
aﬀected by the wider society to the extent that they opt to coexist more closely with it. For
example, an Indian immigrant community which had chosen (whether separately or collectively)
to settle in the midst of English society might be determined to retain certain customs or
practices, but would be subject to established legal provisions for, say, testator’s family
maintenance. In this respect, such communities would be open to legal challenge by their own
members who dissent from the rulings of the community. It would also aﬀect the community’s
understanding of the marriage contract, and possibly its understanding of the obligations of
children to their parents.’ And see my ‘Cultural Toleration’, which stresses that ‘Communities
have thus to strike a balance between retaining their own practices and moral ideals and
compromising them in order to enter the public realm of civil life’ (Kukathas 1997).
35 Shachar 2001, 69.
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This brings us back, then, to Susan Okin’s critique. The core of her argument
is the claim that without the capacity for exit the right of exit is of little worth,
and that some form of intervention is necessary to ensure that women acquire
this capacity if they are being raised in groups that are likely to neglect to do so.
That the capacity to exit is necessary to enjoy the right of exit is diﬃcult to deny.
The question here is whether steps must be taken to ensure that women acquire
this capacity. This question turns on a number of issues: whether or not women
can acquire this capacity without intervention; what having the capacity to exit
means; and what are the implications of intervention to ensure the development
of capacities. Let us address these issues in turn.
Even in the most diﬃcult circumstances women often acquire the capacity to
exit associations or arrangements they dislike or abhor, though they just as often
ﬁnd it diﬃcult, or even ‘impossible’, to exit when they do not lack the resources
to leave situations they ﬁnd hard to bear. This observation holds true not only for
women. And it is not diﬃcult to see why. The poorer or less favourable one’s
circumstances, the harder it is to garner the resources necessary to leave them,
but the greater the incentive to get what’s needed and to get out. The more
favourable one’s circumstances, however, the easier it is to leave, but the weaker
the incentive to do so. The composition of the world’s refugee numbers bears out
this observation: those who ﬂee are those whose circumstances are worst, while
those who remain tend to be those who have something to lose and less to gain
by leaving. Those with nothing to lose cannot easily be controlled, unless their
very desires are moulded. To the extent that Okin’s argument is that women have
diﬃculty exiting unhappy circumstances because of a lack of resources, her
position is overstated, since many women can and do leave marriages, commu-
nities, and cultures. The greater diﬃculty they face is often that they may have
nowhere to go if the outside world is unwilling to admit them. (I do not, however,
wish to overstate this view either; clearly, the willingness of the outside world to
admit someone is dependent on what that person has to oﬀer, and someone
well-educated, conﬁdent, and healthy will always be more readily welcomed.36)
But most of Okin’s concern is not that women do not always have the
resources to exit but that they lack the capacity even to consider the possibility
of doing so. The problem is ‘indoctrination’, or socialization more generally,
which prevents women from acquiring the desire to exit their condition. Here we
36 An anecdote illustrates this point well. An Australian migration oﬃcial who recently visited
the Nairobi oﬃce of the UNHCR told the resettlement oﬃcer that he should understand that he
was looking mainly for professionals – doctors and engineers, preferably – who would be the
best candidates for resettlement in Australia. He was less than happy to be told that he could
be oﬀered only a number of women who had been raped and traumatised.
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are on trickier ground. The implication of Okin’s view is that the liberal state
ought to take measures to ensure that the socialization of women does not create
women with the wrong sorts of desires. Then they might be capable of making
better choices, including the choice to exit. The attractiveness of such a view has
seemed obvious to many liberals since John Stuart Mill ﬁrst advanced it. If we
value freedom, surely it is important that we have social institutions which
create people – citizens – who value freedom and are able to exercise it?
Contemporary liberal theorists such as William Galston and Stephen Macedo
have argued as much from their otherwise diﬀerent perspectives. Yet it is a view
that should be rejected, particularly by liberals.Why?
It is characteristic of human societies that people try to bring others around to
their way of thinking, and to share their understanding of what is a good life.
Many of the beliefs we hold, and particularly religious beliefs, are ours because
we are socialized to embrace them. Even the philosopher, Elizabeth Anscombe,
admitted that it was hard to imagine how she could have acquired her Catholic
faith, and belief in some of its central tenets, had she not been raised to do so.
Indeed, so necessary is the power to socialize if some beliefs are to be inculcated
that important political conﬂicts have revolved precisely around the issue of who
will have the power to shape people’s understandings of what is good.What is to
be done when such conﬂicts arise? The liberal answer is that we ﬁnd ways of
allowing diﬀerent views to co-exist, separately and peacefully, rather than seek to
establish the one true way. On this account, liberalism is about a kind of neutrality
on the question of what is the good life, rather than a doctrine about the good life.
The implication of this is that it is a mistake to think that it is a part of the
role of the state in a good society to ensure the socialization of its citizens in
particular ways, to ensure that they do not have the wrong kinds of preferences.
On the contrary, the liberal’s task is to resist such calls, which will come from all
quarters, and particularly from non-liberals who complain that the principle of
neutrality itself exercises too powerful a socializing inﬂuence – making it more
diﬃcult for them to inculcate religious values in particular. The best reply the
liberal has against the charge that liberal neutrality is nothing more than that
the covert enforcement of another sectarian doctrine, is the reply that the liberal
state makes possible room for dissent. It makes it possible for dissenting views
to exit from the mainstream – though it will refuse to turn away those who wish
to leave their dissenting communities.
This, however, means accepting all expressed preferences or desires as
authentic. Even if they are the products of a form of socialization that dis-
courages people from considering the possibility of not believing or accepting
the things they have been raised to think or embrace. It means accepting that
people will grow up with religious beliefs whose grounds we think utterly
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implausible, and whose implications are that such people will lead a life that is
completely deluded. It also means accepting that in many communities women
will be brought up imprisoned by beliefs they hold without any conception of
the limitations that have been imposed upon them. The alternative is for the
liberal state to determine which preferences it will and will not recognize as
genuine or authentic, or will and will not allow to be reproduced.
One of the real problems here is that to try to reform the ways in which
women in some cultural communities are educated or raised is to go against the
preferences of many women themselves. Sometimes even the most harmful
practices, such as female genital cutting and footbinding have been sustained
with the active and insistent support of women themselves. (I will say more on
these particular issues presently.) It is diﬃcult to foist liberation upon people,
particularly when they do not see it as liberation at all. But what of cases where
women already have a sense of the burdens they bear but are unable to extricate
themselves because the costs are too great? Okin cites the case of a woman
whose options of appealing to the law to prevent an unwanted marriage, or of
changing her religion to escape its strictures, as having options which are
unthinkable. Surely something might be done here?
The problem here, however, is that the woman described is not so much
unable to exit as confronted with a terrible dilemma: to pursue her own happiness
or satisfy her parents’ wishes; to escape to freedom or to abide by her faith. The
problem is that a tradeoﬀ has to bemade.The nature of such dilemmas is captured
with great power in the letters of a young Javanese noble-woman, Kartini, to her
Dutch friend and correspondent, Stella Zeehandelaar.Written in the early part of
the twentieth century, Kartini describes both her aﬀection for her family and
people and great desire that the virtues of the Javanese will one day come to be
better understood and appreciated by Europeans, and her no less fervent desire to
escape from the obligations by which she is burdened as a dutiful daughter. In
these letters, one of Kartini’s most ﬁrmly expressed desires is to broaden her own
education, and make education available to Javanese women. No less important
to her is her longing not to be forced into marriage.Yet in the end she forsakes her
opportunity to study abroad to stay with her ailing father, and agrees to amarriage
arranged by custom. ‘I must not lose sight,’ she writes, ‘of my duty as a child, nor
those duties which I need to fulﬁl towards myself especially if my fulﬁlment
aﬀects not just my own happiness but also the well-being of others. The issue is
now, how am I able to harmonize these two great duties which I have to fulﬁl and
which are precisely diametrically opposed to each other?’37
37 Kartini, op.cit., p.81.
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Kartini is perhaps precisely the kind of person Shachar has in mind when
she refers to the ‘beleaguered individual’ confronted with the ‘responsibility to
either miraculously transform the legal-institutional conditions that keep her
vulnerable or ﬁnd the resources to leave her whole world behind.’ Yet the
problem for Kartini is not a lack of resources. She is educated and has the
opportunity to make her own way in the world. What holds her back is her
attachments. What needs to change for her to be spared the dilemma is for her
parents’ attitudes to change. There may be no way around the fact that responsi-
bility for the education of parents will fall on the beleaguered individual, for no
one else may be capable of eﬀecting it.
An important part of my point here is that, in the end, responsibility for
change within cultural communities and traditions has to come from within, and
to the extent that such changes are necessary to give women the capacity to exit
that responsibility must fall upon those women. One reason this is so is that
women are all too likely to resist reforms that go against their own beliefs. We
can see this in the history of two cultural practices which have been unquestion-
ably harmful to women, and yet have persisted for hundreds of years in spite of
repeated attempts to end them: footbinding in China, and Female Genital Cutting
(FGC) in North Africa. One of the reasons attempts simply to end the practices by
banning them failed is that both practices were too tightly woven into customs
and systems of belief (including aesthetic values) that made women highly
resistant to attempts to end them. More precisely, they resisted reform because
they feared for the welfare of their daughters if they did not subject them to these
procedures that invariably deformed and scarred them, and kept them in intense
physical pain. In both cases, the fear of mothers was that their daughters would
be rendered unmarriageable if their feet were not bound, or if they were not
appropriately cut. No one was prepared to defect from these conventions for fear
of leaving her daughters to remain unmarried in societies where single women
could not survive. Footbinding in China was ended abruptly not by edict but by
the formation of promise-keeping groups who agreed to defect collectively. And
Gerry Mackie has argued that the end of FGC is most likely to be brought about
by similar mechanisms if cultural resistance is to be overcome.38 Though it has
to be conceded that, in such cases, even if sanctions or punishments will not
work, the mere existence of a formal right of exit is not enough. The right of exit
may be hard to exercise when it requires not just one’s own defection but
collective action to exit collectively.
38 Mackie 1996.
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This brings us to the issue of what steps ought to be taken by the liberal
state to ensure that women have ‘realistic rights of exit’. At times, Okin is quite
forthright in her insistence that the state should take very ﬁrm action to ensure
that women are not forced into marriage, or denied an education, or subject to
other forms of ill-treatment, suggesting that those who harm women in this way
be punished for doing so. What exactly the state should do to punish such
things, however, is not clear, particularly if parents and communities resist
change. One option would be to imprison parents; another would be to remove
children from their care. Both of these options have been taken by governments
in the past, with limited success, and there is good reason to be sceptical about
them – particularly if the welfare of children is the main concern.
The issue becomes even more diﬃcult, however, when the power exercised
by parents or community is more subtle. How would the state intervene in the
case of someone like Kartini, who faces the dilemma she does precisely because
of her love of her parents and her culture? Even though she regarded European
ways as superior and more enlightened, and was at times driven to the brink of
despair by the failure of her eﬀorts to make education more accessible to women
in Java, Kartini was not willing to go against her parents or culture, and was
highly critical of the Dutch administration for its failure to treat its colonial
subjects fairly. To have intervened on Kartini’s behalf against her parents would
almost surely have provoked her to come to the defence of her traditions and her
countrymen. Blood is thicker than theory.
The matter of forced marriage also provides a diﬃcult problem for interven-
tion. There is usually less of a problem when the marriage is literally forced upon
a bride who would run away if she could. She might still have the opportunity to
escape and have the marriage annulled for having been entered into under
duress. She can claim the protection of the laws of the wider society, which do
not recognize marriage in such circumstances. But the problem is more diﬃcult
when the bride marries because she prefers marriage to displeasing or dishon-
ouring her parents. The marriage in this case is forced in the sense that she has
been compelled to make a tradeoﬀ. But within the context of the tradeoﬀ that
had to be made, she was not forced to make the choice she did; she could have
exited and borne the cost of parental anger, or even of being shunned.What can
the liberal state do to make her condition any better if what this woman desires
is both independence and parental love and approval, but desires the latter
more? Her rights of exit cannot be made more realistic by giving her more
resources. They can only be made more realistic by changing her desires or by
changing the desires of her parents. The problem with this is that it can only be
achieved by ignoring this woman’s actual desires, and by invoking desires she
does not hold as dear.
Exit, Freedom and Gender 51
<i>On Exit : Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Right of Exit in Liberal Multicultural Societies</i>, edited by Dagmar Borchers,
         and Annamari Vitikainen, De Gruyter, Inc., 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=893612.
Created from smu on 2019-10-15 20:01:19.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 D
e 
G
ru
yt
er
, I
nc
.. 
Al
l r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
All of this holds even before one considers the fact that there are other
problems associated with any sort of reliance on the state as an agent of social
reform.
In such circumstances, intervention should be considered a last resort. But if
intervention is ruled out as an option, what then remains? The argument of
defenders of group rights is that the state ought to intervene positively to support
groups in their eﬀorts to maintain their traditions and practices. If, however, we
take seriously the claims of those women who wish to reform their cultural
traditions, it would be wrong to give any special recognition or succour to
cultural groups. It would be best to recognize the freedom of all individuals to
exit their communities if they so wish. This would not only oﬀer to them some
opportunity to escape from oppression but also empower them within their own
communities to the extent that the threat of defection lends strength to voices of
reform. At the same time, this takes seriously the concerns of communities of
people who might dispute the claims of disaﬀected minorities, and fear that their
own ways of life might be held hostage to the desires of those members who
want to change it. The more is done to make exit a ‘realistic’ possibility, the more
the community whose practices are the object of reform will rightly feel ag-
grieved that their way of life is being deliberately undermined. What the princi-
ple of exit attempts to do is strike a balance which denies the community the
right to be guaranteed the persistence of its way of life, yet declines to authorize
anyone to hasten its demise.
Feminism, Multiculturalism, and Exit
Feminism and multiculturalism are in tension, as Susan Okin more than anyone
has made abundantly clear. Those among her critics who have challenged her on
this point, and have suggested that there might be some reconciliation between
the interests of women and the claims of culture, have a point. But it is a point of
limited signiﬁcance, since it is one Okin can readily concede; her point, however,
is that there are many cases in which no reconciliation is possible, since the two
positions will come into conﬂict when the interests of women and the claims of
culture result in contending demands.39 The question is how to think system-
atically about the problem of addressing this conﬂict.
39 I have defended this view at greater length in Kukathas 2001, 83–98.
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The Plain Exit Principle oﬀers an answer to this question.What it represents
is the philosophical core of a political stance that says, when people disagree
about how they should live, political institutions should accommodate that
disagreement rather than take sides. In reality, no political institutions can avoid
taking sides at least to a small degree. In this respect, the exit principle is
unrealistic insofar as it advocates a standard that may be impossible for any
polity to adopt. Its merit, however, is that it attempts to strike a balance between
two other alternatives with problems of their own.
The ﬁrst alternative is a theory of multiculturalism that advocates strong
protection for cultural groups to enable particular ways of life to endure. The
problem with this view is that it ends up demanding that some of its unwilling
members be coerced into supporting traditions they would just as soon abandon.
This version of multiculturalism asks either that cultural communities’ authority
over recalcitrant members be recognized, or that the state grant communities
additional resources to keep their members compliant, or that the state make it
more diﬃcult for those members to leave so that they cannot credibly demand
reform in exchange for compliance. This alternative theory sacriﬁces individual
freedom in the interests of cultural community.
The second alternative is feminism, which asserts that ways of life that
neglect or trample on the interests of women should not be tolerated but
discouraged. Feminism, in all its variety, is a doctrine of women’s freedom; and
it is one that demands that the standards of freedom be used to judge, shape,
and reform all forms of human association. The problem with the feminist
perspective, however, is that it oﬀers not so much an account of how diﬀerence
or disagreement might be accommodated as a critique of traditions, cultures, or
legal arrangements that insist on women’s unequal (and inferior) status. Its
strength as an ethical theory is also its weakness as a political theory.
The Plain Exit Principle is a principle of accommodation. It is not, however,
the only conceivable principle of accommodation; and its merit has often been
questioned by those who consider it overly zealous in the cause of toleration. Jeﬀ
Spinner-Halev expresses this concern very clearly:
A single-minded liberal theory is in danger of losing sight of crucial liberal values. A heavy
emphasis on toleration threatens equality and individual autonomy by allowing all kinds
of groups to exist, regardless of their practices … . I worry less about a theory that admits
to internal tensions than I do about a theory that is much too singular in its aims. A
relentlessly consistent political theory can too easily become relentlessly tyrannical.40
40 Spinner-Hale 2005, 157–171, at 171.
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Spinner-Halev is a pluralist, but not what Anthony Appiah calls a ‘hard plural-
ist’.41 He appreciates that diﬀerent values have to be ‘balanced’, the one against
the other, ‘so that they all can coexist, however uneasily.’42 Why apply the exit
principle relentlessly, rather than recognize that freedom of exit, important
though it may be, is not all that matters? A more practical principle might be one
such as that advanced implicitly by Alison Renteln, in her defence of a policy of
‘maximum accommodation’. She puts the point as follows:
In democratic political systems individuals expect to have basic rights such as religious
liberty, freedom from government intrusion in the family, and freedom of association. But
they should also have the right to follow their cultural traditions, unless these traditions
cause irreparable physical harm to others. In the absence of the threat of serious harm,
liberal democracies should not interfere with cultural traditions. The presumption should
be that governments ought not intervene unless failure to do so would result in death or
irreparable physical harm to members of the ethnic minority group.43
Surely such an approach would be more realistic, more reasonable, and philoso-
phically more plausible than the unyielding attachment to an abstract principle?
Tolerate by all means; but don’t let toleration eclipse other important values
entirely.
There are two responses I would make here. The ﬁrst is that principles that
build balance, reasonableness, and a willingness to relent in the face of unplea-
sant or troubling implications do not always turn out to be particularly helpful.
For the most part, all they do is shift the debate to other issues or arenas. The
more reasonable principle that governments should not intervene ‘unless failure
to do so would result in death or irreparable physical harm’, for example,
requires that we rejoin the battle on diﬀerent grounds: what counts as death or
irreparable physical harm? In the debate over how to deal with cultural diﬀer-
ence, this takes us back to where we started: what do we do when people dispute
what counts as harm, or even death. (For example, in many societies even the
mainstream is divided over the question of whether an aborted foetus is harmed
or killed.) Qualiﬁcations bring no practical rewards.
My second response is that political theory – like philosophy more gener-
ally – should be relentlessly consistent. It would be naïve, if not absurd, to
expect consistency in politics, since public oﬃcials have to respond the pres-
sures exerted by diﬀerent constituencies, and are generally happy if they can
41 Appiah 2005, 73ﬀ.
42 Spinner-Halev 2005, 171.
43 Renteln 2004, 19.
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mollify, not reconcile, the diverse perspectives found within political society. But
philosophy, even political philosophy, is not politics. If it has any contribution to
make, it is a contribution to understanding rather than to practice. And if the
correct understanding is that there are many values that are important, philoso-
phy should try to say something about how we should think consistently about
the problem of accommodating or trading-oﬀ diverse or conﬂicting values. It
may, of course, be that no principle can be devised or uncovered that will guide
us through the mineﬁeld of value-conﬂict.We may just end up opting one way or
another, under the inﬂuence of other considerations: interest, intuition, or ma-
jority power, for example. At this point, however, there is nothing to be gained
by invoking a political theory whose ﬂexibility is alleged to lend credence to this
practice. We might as well admit that some of the things we do in political life
have no principled basis.
The Plain Exit Principle is oﬀered here as a way of thinking systematically
about how diﬀerence or disagreement between cultural traditions might be
accommodated in a consistent and principled way, assuming that there is no
good reason why any such accommodation should favor the convictions of those
powerful enough to implement a solution. It cannot, I think, be denied that this
principle challenges important feminist concerns, just as it repudiates the de-
mands of some multiculturalists. Both of these perspectives insist that there are
important considerations at stake – the freedom of women to live autonomous
lives, and the need for some people to hold on to the traditions or ways that give
their lives meaning. The inadequacy of the exit principle may appear to be
reﬂected in the fact that its resolution of this conﬂict leaves both parties dissa-
tisﬁed. Equally, it may just capture the fact that the dilemma it addresses is a
diﬃcult one, and that no resolution is going to be entirely satisfactory.
Bibliography
Appiah Kwame Anthony (2005), The Ethics of Identity, Princeton.
Barry Brian (2001), Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Oxford.
Barry Brian (2002), “Second Thoughts – And Some First Thoughts Revived”, In: Kelly Paul (ed.),
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and Its Critics, Oxford, 204–238.
Bayle Pierre (1708), Philosophical Commentary on the Words of Jesus Christ, Compel them to
Come In, London, 146.
Coté Joost/Clayton Victoria (eds.) (1995), On Feminism and Nationalism: Kartini’s Letters to
Stella Zeehandelaar 1899–1903, Monash Asia Institute, 1.
Kukathas Chandran (1992a), “Are There Any Cultural Rights?”, In: Political Theory 20(1),
105–139.
Exit, Freedom and Gender 55
<i>On Exit : Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Right of Exit in Liberal Multicultural Societies</i>, edited by Dagmar Borchers,
         and Annamari Vitikainen, De Gruyter, Inc., 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=893612.
Created from smu on 2019-10-15 20:01:19.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 D
e 
G
ru
yt
er
, I
nc
.. 
Al
l r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Kukathas Chandran (1992b), “Cultural Rights Again: a Rejoinder to Kymlicka”, In: Political
Theory 20(4), 674–680.
Kukathas Chandran (1997), “Cultural Toleration”, In: Kymlicka Will/Shapiro Ian (eds.), Ethnicity
and Group Rights, NOMOS XXXIX, New York, 69–104.
Kukathas Chandran (2001), “Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?”, In: Public Aﬀairs Quarterly
5(2), 83–98.
Kukathas Chandran (2002), “The Life of Brian, or Now For Something Completely Diﬀerence-
blind”, In: Kelly Paul (ed.), Multiculturalism Re-considered: Culture and Equality and Its
Critics, Oxford, 184–203.
Mackie Gerry (1996), “Ending Footbinding and Inﬁbulation: A ConventionAccount”, In: American
Sociological Review, 61(6), 999–1017.
Okin Susan M. (1998), “Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions”, In: Ethics 108,
661–684.
Okin Susan M. (1999), “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?”, In: Cohen Joshua/Howard
Matthew/Nussbaum Martha C. (eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton,
9–24.
Okin Susan M. (2002), ‘“Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic
Rights of Exit’, In: Ethics 112 (2), 205–230.
Rawls John (1999), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA.
Renteln Alison Dundes (2004), The Cultural Defense, Oxford.
Shachar Ayelet (2000), “On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability”, In: Political Theory 28,
64–89.
Shachar Ayelet (2001),Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Diﬀerences and Women’s Rights,
Cambridge.
Spinner-Halev Jeﬀ (2000), Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship, Baltimore.
Spinner-Halev Jeﬀ (2005), “Autonomy, association and pluralism”, In: Eisenberg Avigail/
Spinner-Halev Jeﬀ (eds.), Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity, Cam-
bridge, 157–171.
56 Chandran Kukathas
<i>On Exit : Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Right of Exit in Liberal Multicultural Societies</i>, edited by Dagmar Borchers,
         and Annamari Vitikainen, De Gruyter, Inc., 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=893612.
Created from smu on 2019-10-15 20:01:19.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 D
e 
G
ru
yt
er
, I
nc
.. 
Al
l r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
